spotlight europe 2008/05, May 2008: Green Light from the Emerald Isle? Ten Questions and Answers about Ireland by Hierlemann, Dominik & Heydecker, Christian
 
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
#
 
2
0
0
8
/
0
5
 
spotlight europe 
# 2008/05 – May 2008 
Green Light from the Emerald 
Isle? Ten Questions and  
Answers about Ireland  
Dominik Hierlemann 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, dominik.hierlemann@bertelsmann.de
Christian Heydecker 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, christian.heydecker@bertelsmann.de
On 12 June 2008 Europeans will be looking intently at Ireland, for the 
Irish electorate is the only one in Europe which is being permitted to vote 
on the Treaty of Lisbon. For a long time the referendum seemed to be a 
foregone conclusion. However, as the poll approaches, a “Yes” vote is be-
ginning to seem more uncertain. Ten questions and answers shed some 
light on the current situation. 
 
I 
How do the Irish vote on 
European issues? 
Over the past 36 years there have been six 
referendums in Ireland on crucial deci-
sions pertaining to the European integra-
tion process. Whenever there is a funda-
mental change in the European treaties, 
the electorate has the right to express its 
views on the subject at the ballot box. On 
five occasions the Irish voted in favour of 
the European project at issue – member-
ship of the EC in 1972, and the revision of 
the treaties in 1987, 1992, 1998 and 2002. 
Thus in June 2001 it came as a complete 
surprise to other Europeans when the Irish 
rejected the Treaty of Nice. 
 
The Irish electorate was the only one in 
Europe which was asked to comment on 
the Treaty of Nice, whereas in all of the 
other member states the decision lay with 
the national parliaments. In view of the 
unruffled nature of the previous referen-
dums, the clearly pro-European attitudes 
of the voters, and Ireland’s positive eco-
nomic development after 1973 in the wake 
of EC membership, the political establish-
m e n t  i n  D u b l i n  a n d  B r u s s e l s  m a d e  t h e  
mistake of thinking that obtaining support 
for the Treaty would be a mere formality. 
As it happened, electoral participation 
dropped to 35 per cent, and 54 per cent of 
the Irish electorate voted “No”. The most 
famous slogan was “If you don’t know, 
vote No”. Almost one in two of those who 
had voted against the Treaty stated that 
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they felt they had not been given enough 
information. 
 
The “No” camp was spearheaded by the 
Greens, Sinn Féin and the Socialist Party. 
Their campaign was based on polarization: 
“No to Nice, No to NATO”, and “You will 
lose Power, Money and Freedom”. The op-
ponents of the Treaty warned against at-
tempts to undermine the traditional Irish 
policy of neutrality by the introduction of 
the EU rapid reaction force, which they 
perceived as a forerunner of a European 
army. Furthermore, they believed that the 
smaller member states would be marginal-
ized by the new decision-making system, 
and predicted the emergence of a Euro-
pean super-state and a “tidal wave of im-
migration” as a result of eastern enlarge-
ment. 
 
II 
What were the conse-
quences of the “No” to 
the Treaty of Nice? 
In order to secure the support of the elec-
torate in a second referendum held in Oc-
tober 2002, the Irish government imple-
mented a number of specific measures: 
 
•  National Forum on Europe: The all-party 
National Forum on Europe was established 
in October 2001. Its members included 
both supporters of the treaty and euro-
sceptics. The aim was to remedy the in-
formation deficit among voters and to fa-
cilitate a broad debate about Ireland’s 
membership of the EU and the future of 
Europe. 
 
•  National Declaration of Ireland: The 
Irish government emphasized in this 
declaration, which is not legally binding, 
that the traditional policy of neutrality 
would not be affected by the Treaty of 
Nice. A “triple lock” was enacted for par-
ticipation in EU military operations. In ad-
dition to assent from the Irish government 
and the Dáil, it envisages a mandate from 
the UN Security Council. 
 
•  Supplemental clause: A new clause in 
the Irish constitution provided a guarantee 
that Ireland would not participate in the 
common European defence policy before 
the electorate had given its express assent 
to such a step in a referendum. 
 
•  Parliamentary scrutiny: The Irish gov-
ernment enhanced the rights of the par-
liament with regard to European policy is-
sues by instituting a new “Committee on 
European Affairs” and by mandating a 
strict government duty to provide informa-
tion. 
 
As a result of all this, the second referen-
dum was a success. A broad majority (63 
per cent) of the Irish voters gave the green  
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light for eastern enlargement and the nec-
essary institutional reforms. A decisive 
factor was the mobilization of voters who 
had abstained in the first referendum. 
 
III 
What is the current mood 
in the country? 
Although more than 90 per cent of the 
Treaty of Lisbon is identical with the Con-
stitutional Treaty, in Ireland support for 
the new European basic document seems 
to have evaporated. The large number of 
undecided voters makes it especially diffi-
cult to predict the result of the vote on 12 
June. More than two-thirds of the Irish 
electorate is of the opinion that it does not 
know enough about what the treaty con-
tains, and only one voter in ten feels that 
he has actually been given sufficient in-
formation. It is a noteworthy and perturb-
ing fact that it was precisely this lack of 
information which led to the rejection of 
the Treaty of Nice in the referendum held 
in June 2001. 
 
Voter participation will be of decisive im-
portance for the outcome of the referen-
dum on the Reform Treaty. In the past the 
average participation in referendums was 
slightly above 52 per cent. The situation 
will become rather precarious if participa-
tion, as in the case of the first unsuccess-
ful referendum on the Treaty of Nice (35 
per cent), were to sink significantly below 
the 50 per cent mark. The opponents of 
the treaty will no doubt, as always, man-
age to mobilize their supporters as the 
campaign progresses. 
 
Thus in the run-up to the referendum the 
Irish political parties have an important 
task to accomplish. In Ireland the classic 
cleavages are of only secondary impor-
tance, and categories such as “right” and 
“left” are devoid of meaning. To this day 
the political parties owe far more to the 
struggle for Irish independence in the 
1920s. It saw the rise of what are still the 
two predominant parties. Fianna Fáil has 
been the strongest political force in Ire-
land since 1932, whereas Fine Gael has 
usually been in opposition. After the par-
liamentary elections in May 2007 and 
more than ten years of two-party rule un-
der Fianna Fáil and the liberal Progressive 
Democrats, the government was expanded 
to include a new coalition partner, the 
Greens. 
 
For a long time there was a danger that 
Prime Minister Bertie Ahern’s bad ap-
proval ratings might have an adverse ef-
fect on the result of the referendum. 
Whilst Ahern was being touted as a prom-
ising candidate for the forthcoming office 
of President of the European Council on 
the European stage, at home 54 per cent of 
the voters were dissatisfied with him, and 
as many as 78 per cent doubted his credi-
bility. “Teflon Bertie”, who had always 
managed to shrug things off in the past, 
finally stepped down from all his political 
offices on 6 May on account of persistent 
criticism of his personal financial dealings 
and accusations of corruption. The danger 
of an anti-Ahern vote has thus been 
averted. It is now up to his successor 
Brian Cowen, hitherto Minister for Fi-
nance, to secure Irish approval for the 
Treaty of Lisbon.  
 
IV 
Are the Irish still  
pro-European? 
Ireland has always been one of the mem-
ber states whose citizens have had the 
most positive attitude towards European 
integration. The figures published in the 
most recent Eurobarometer show that 74 
per cent of the Irish – compared to an EU 
average of 58 per cent – believe that their 
country’s membership of the EU is “a good 
thing”. And as many as 87 per cent, which 
is the highest figure in the whole of the 
European Union, are convinced that Ire-
land benefits from its membership of the 
EU.  
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On account of the traditional Irish policy 
of neutrality, the Irish government has al-
ways expressed reservations about par-
ticipating in the Common Defence Policy. 
However, 67 per cent of the Irish are in 
fact in favour of a Common Security and 
Defence Policy, and 66 per cent would 
welcome a Common Foreign Policy. 
Yet positive opinion poll results do not 
provide a guarantee that a referendum will 
turn out to be a success. Virtually identi-
cal results were obtained before the first 
referendum on the Treaty of Nice – and at 
the end of the day the Irish still said “No”. 
In Ireland there is obviously a large group 
of what are known as “soft supporters”. It 
is true that they are fundamentally pro-
European, though without active mobiliza-
tion they either do not vote at all, or in 
fact vote “No”.  
 
V 
In which areas has Ireland 
secured opt-outs? 
Like other member states, Ireland has ne-
gotiated opt-outs from European law in 
certain policy areas. Its past opt-outs show 
that Ireland has always tended to adopt 
dom. One particular opt-out negotiated by 
its British neighbours has direct implica-
tions for the “Emerald Isle”. The two states 
have traditionally formed a “Common 
Travel Area” in which there are no border 
controls. Their geographical situation as 
islands without direct land borders with 
other member states is perceived in Dub-
lin and London as an advantage in the 
fight against organized crime and illegal 
immigration. Furthermore, the UK and Ire-
land have similar legal systems, in which 
common law – and not statute law as on 
the Continent – plays a more prominent 
role. 
 
the same measures as the United King-
ince 1999 Ireland, like the United King-
he Treaty of Lisbon makes provision for 
S
dom, has not participated in all of the 
measures provided for in the Schengen 
Agreement, which regulates the abolition 
of passport controls at the internal borders 
between the member states. However, on 
the basis of a unanimous Council decision 
both states can adopt certain parts of the 
Agreement. Thus in June 2000 Ireland ap-
plied to participate in the implementation 
of certain provisions of the Schengen ac-
quis, such as, e.g. drug enforcement and 
the Schengen Information System. 
 
T
another opt-out. Ireland and the United  
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Kingdom fear that they may possibly be at 
a disadvantage in the area of police and 
judicial co-operation in criminal matters 
on account of the planned transition in the 
Council from unanimity to decision-
making based on qualified majorities. Yet 
Ireland has retained the option of partici-
pating in EU activities on a case-by-case 
basis (“opt-in”). Three years after the 
Treaty of Lisbon has entered into force the 
opt-out will be reviewed and possibly re-
voked. Originally the Irish government 
had also toyed with the idea of joining the 
United Kingdom and Poland in the opt-out 
protocol relating to the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights. 
 
VI 
How was Ireland  
In 1973, w  EC, it 
  Economic growth: In the second half of 
  Gross domestic product: In 1987 the 
 
  State debt: In the 1980s Ireland still had 
  Balance of Trade: 60 per cent of Irish 
  Population development: Ireland has 
  Modern service society: On account of 
owever, shortly before the referendum 
transformed? 
hen Ireland joined the
was an economically weak country with 
the lowest per capita income in the then 
Community of Nine. Right up to the end of 
the 1980s the Irish struggled to cope with 
economic stagnation, high unemployment, 
state debt and emigration. After a dra-
matic process of economic adjustment, the 
former “poorhouse of Europe” became one 
of the EU’s “model pupils”. This was the 
birth of the “Celtic Tiger”. In many areas 
Ireland has not only drawn level with the 
other member states, but has already left 
them a long way behind.  
 
•
the 1990s Ireland had an average 
economic growth rate of 9.4 per cent per 
annum. Even the slower growth in evi-
dence since the turn of the millennium 
still amounts to an impressive 5.5 per cent 
per annum. 
 
•
Irish per capita gross domestic product 
amounted to no more than 69 per cent of 
the EU average. Just two decades later Ire-
land is in the lead with 146 per cent, and 
has been surpassed only by Luxembourg. 
•  Unemployment: In the 1990s the
unemployment rate declined from 15.6 per 
cent (1993) to 4.3 per cent (2000), and has 
since stayed at this level. In this period 
the number of people employed almost 
doubled. 
 
•
the highest per capita state debt in the 
world. On account of strict fiscal disci-
pline, above-average economic growth and 
high tax revenues the state debt sank from 
95 per cent (1990) to 25 per cent (2006) of 
the gross domestic product. 
 
•
exports are shipped to other EU states. In 
the meantime Ireland has become the 
third-largest per capita exporting nation in 
the world after Singapore and Belgium. In 
2007 the trade surplus amounted to €26.4 
billion. 
 
•
changed from being a country of emigrants 
to being a country of immigrants. In 1971 
the  population numbered 2.9 million. By 
1991 it had increased to 3.5 million, and 
has currently reached about 4.2 million 
inhabitants. This is nothing short of a his-
torical and psychological revolution in a 
small country where emigration has been 
part of the local mythology for centuries. 
 
•
the stepwise transition from agriculture to 
high technology and service industries, 
the number of people employed in the ag-
ricultural sector has decreased in recent 
decades from 255,000 (1973) to 110,000 
(2007). 
 
H
there have been signs for the first time for 
almost two decades that the Irish eco-
nomic boom is coming to an end. The eco-
nomic growth forecasts for the current 
year recently had to be revised down-
wards, and the unemployment rate has 
risen to the highest level for nine years. 
Ireland’s close connections with the bat-
tered U.S. economy, the ramifications of  
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the international financial crisis and the 
pressure exerted on its export-oriented 
economy by the strong euro, may well 
have a negative impact. 
 
VII 
To what extent does Ire-
land benefit from the EU? 
As an (erstwhile) structurally weak
he large net contributor countries such as 
he  Irish economic boom can be traced 
  Proactive direct investment policy: Ire-
  Repayment of state debt: Since 1987 
  Low labour costs: It was agreed by the 
he external factors were the introduction 
 coun-
try Ireland benefited significantly from 
subsidies after joining the EC in 1973. In 
the period between 1973 and 2005 (after 
subtracting its own contributions to the 
EU budget) Ireland received net transfers 
amounting to about €40 billion, that is, on 
average €1.8 billion annually. For the first 
time and as a result of its successful eco-
nomic progress, Ireland will probably be 
one of the net contributors towards the 
end of 2007-2013 budget period. 
 
T
Germany and France have repeatedly 
pointed out that the Irish boom can pri-
marily be traced back to sizeable EU trans-
fer payments. However, this theory does 
not explain everything. There can be no 
doubt that the subsidies accelerated the 
adjustment process in the economy. How-
ever, it tends to be forgotten that in the 
1970s and 1980s Ireland also received 
money from Brussels, the effect of which 
seemed negligible at the time. On the 
other hand, the enduring economic weak-
ness of the mezzogiorno area in Italy dem-
onstrates that decades of financial support 
from the EU budget cannot guarantee that 
there will be economic recovery. 
 
T
back to the interaction of various internal 
and external factors. The internal factors 
include: 
 
•
land was able to attract a large amount of 
foreign (and in particular U.S.) direct in-
vestment. On account of the comparatively 
low corporation taxes, numerous multina-
tional companies from the computing, 
pharmaceutical and financial services sec-
tors chose Ireland as their “gateway” to 
the European internal market. 
 
•
every Irish government has pursued a pol-
icy of fiscal discipline, and this has taken 
the pressure off the national budget. 
 
•
government, the trade unions and the em-
ployers in a number of employment pacts 
that employees would exercise a great deal 
of wage restraint. This was made up for by 
decidedly low rates of taxation. 
 
T
of the European internal market and EU 
subsidies. As a result of the reforms and 
reorientation implemented in 1988/89, the 
disbursements from the Structural and 
Cohesion Funds almost doubled. This sig-
nificant increase at the beginning of the 
1990s gave an additional boost to the Irish 
economy. However, the decisive feature 
was that in Ireland the money from the 
Structural Funds was invested first and 
foremost in “brains”, that is, in education 
and training. The classical infrastructure 
projects merely came in second place. This 
had a number of long-term effects on the 
supply side. The above-average qualifica-
tions of its workforce is the feature which 
now sets Ireland apart. 
 
VIII 
The Referendum:  
Who is for and who is 
The two government p  
against the Treaty? 
arties, Fianna Fáil
and the Progressive Democrats, are asking 
the electorate to vote for the Treaty of Lis-
bon, and so are the opposition parties, 
Fine Gael and Labour. On the other hand, 
the traditionally eurosceptical Greens, who 
since 2007 have for the first time been 
part of an Irish coalition government, have  
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been unable to reach agreement on a 
common approach and are permitting their 
members to be involved in whatever side 
they choose. The party leadership has at-
tempted to engineer a change of direction 
with regard to European policy on account 
ticipation in the government. However, a 
special party convention in January failed 
by a narrow margin to secure the two-
thirds majority of the delegates required to 
make support for the Treaty of Lisbon offi-
cial party policy. 
 
T
only one in the Irish parliament which is 
openly in favour of rejecting the Reform 
Treaty. A new actor among the ranks of 
the opponents of the treaty is the 
Libertas group under the leadership of 
the entrepreneur Declan Ganley, who is 
funding an expensive “No” campaign in 
the media. 
 
T
new. It interprets the introduction of 
the dual majority, the restriction of veto 
powers, and the occasional loss of a 
permanent EU Commissioner on ac-
count of the new rotation system as 
evidence of a greater centralization of 
power in Brussels at the expense of the 
small member states. The opponents of 
the treaty once again point to anxieties 
about a possible militarization of Ire-
land as a result of the new solidarity 
clause and the European Defence 
Agency. The “No” camp has also criti-
cized the new “bridging clause”, which 
it sees as a telling example of a Euro-
pean democratic deficit. At some point 
in the future the European Council, 
without having to resort to an official 
amendment of the treaty, could use it to 
implement a transition from consensus 
to majority decision-making. The sub-
sequent referendum and approval from 
the Irish electorate would thus no 
longer be needed. 
 
“F
of the pressures emanating from the par-
Féin and Libertas have decided to 
adopt. However, their campaign is full 
of untruths and myths about the EU. 
They give the impression that the entry 
into force of the Reform Treaty will 
bring with it a Europe-wide harmoniza-
tion of taxes, compulsory NATO mem-
bership, and the liberalization of abor-
n law. On the other hand, they are doing 
everything they can to conceal the fact 
that such decisions will continue to be 
made on the national level.  
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IX 
Has the European Agenda 
In recent weeks leading Eu
n the other hand, Irish policymakers 
urthermore, Dublin is wary of French ini-
he current WTO negotiations may also 
 the Irish media there has been a great 
been postponed and  
delayed? 
ropean politi-
cians have literally been falling over each 
other in Dublin in order to try to persuade 
the Irish to vote “Yes” in the referendum. 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel has 
tried to rally support at the “National Fo-
rum on Europe”, and so have the President 
of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso, 
and the President of the European Parlia-
ment, Hans-Gert Pöttering. 
 
O
were not particularly happy about the 
disruptive statements emanating from 
Paris. In April the French government an-
nounced that during the forthcoming EU 
presidency it would seek to define corpo-
ration tax assessment principles which 
would be applicable in all EU member 
states. This was highly provocative as far 
as Ireland was concerned, since the low 
levels of corporation tax have for many 
years been seen as one of the key ele-
ments of the Irish “economic miracle”. The 
Irish government has described such plans 
for the harmonization of taxes through the 
back door to be “untimely, unhelpful and 
inappropriate”. 
 
F
tiatives in the area of the European Secu-
rity and Defence policy. The subject is 
considered to be an especially sensitive 
one in traditionally neutral Ireland. In fact, 
for its opponents one of the most powerful 
arguments against the Reform Treaty is 
that it will lead to the erosion of Irish neu-
trality. This was one of the reasons why 
the Irish government wanted to hold the 
referendum before the start of the French 
EU Presidency in July 2008. 
 
T
have a negative influence on the outcome 
of the referendum, even though there is 
actually no direct connection with the 
Treaty of Lisbon. Irish farmers are afraid 
that EU Trade Commissioner Peter Man-
delson may be about to make far-reaching 
concessions in the area of agricultural 
subsidies. The Irish Farmers’ Association 
has thus threatened that its members will 
vote “No” in the referendum if their in-
comes are slashed as a result of the WTO 
negotiations. 
 
In
deal of speculation about the existence of 
secret agreements between the govern-
ment in Dublin and the EU Commission. 
According to this theory, all controversial 
initiatives which might unsettle the Irish 
electorate will be shelved until after the 
referendum. Officially both sides have ve-
hemently denied that such an agreement 
exists. However, in recent weeks there 
have in fact been noticeable delays in the 
timetables of various projects, for exam-
ple, in that of the negotiations about the 
reform of the EU budget or in that of the 
submission of the draft health services di-
rective on cross-border healthcare. 
 
X 
What happens if the  
For a long time it seemed as if Irish ap-
irst option: After the dust has settled and 
Irish say “No”? 
proval of the Treaty of Lisbon were a fore-
gone conclusion. So as not to encourage 
doubts about a positive outcome, European 
policymakers have studiously avoided 
speaking about what the alternative op-
tions would be if the Irish returned a “No” 
vote. But what in fact could the EU and 
Ireland actually do if the Reform Treaty 
were to be rejected? 
 
F
an appropriate period of time has elapsed, 
the Irish electorate will be asked once 
again to give its assent to the treaty. Lead-
ing European politicians would try even 
harder than before to convince the elector-
ate that Europe needs an Irish “Yes” vote.  
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This scenario is not particularly probable. 
Why, in contrast to the French and the 
Dutch in the case of the constitutional 
treaty, should the Irish vote a second time 
on an unchanged treaty? 
 
S
However, it is unclear which areas Ireland 
might actually wish to modify. Further-
more, the whole process would have to go 
back to square one, which is what hap-
pened after the rejection of the Constitu-
tional Treaty. This option also seems 
highly unlikely, since in the eyes of citi-
zens the EU would no longer have any 
credibility whatsoever. 
 
T
outs. This would, it is true, be conceivable 
without amending the treaty as a whole 
and embarking on a new ratification proc-
ess in all of the member states. But in the 
sensitive areas such as foreign and secu-
rity policy which play such an important 
role in its national politics, Ireland has al-
ready secured far-reaching opt-outs. 
Where else might Ireland wish to go it 
alone? 
 
F
tempt to introduce comprehensive treaty 
reforms. It decides to pursue minimal re-
forms which will be introduced either in 
the shape of a mini-treaty or below the 
level of treaty amendments by means of 
what are known as inter-institutional 
agreements between the European Parlia-
ment, the Council and the Commission. 
 
T
ing, and that is the reason why the EU and 
the Irish government are putting all their 
bets on one horse. A “No” in the Irish ref-
erendum would simply be a catastrophe 
for Europe. 
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